We study the consequences of CEO turnover announcements on the stock prices of firms in China, where most listed firms remain majority-owned by the state. Our proposition is that state ownership may affect stock market reaction to CEO replacement because state-owned firms often pursue multiple, potentially contradictory, objectives, i.e. economic performance and social objectives. Applying standard event study methodology to a sample of 1,155 announcements from 2002 to 2010, we find that CEO turnover typically produces a positive stock market reaction. The reaction is significantly positive, however, only for enterprises owned by the central government, and not significant for enterprises owned by local governments or privately owned enterprises. These results suggest that a CEO turnover in a central state-owned enterprise signals a renewed commitment to the economic performance objective by state officials. The small size of CEO labor market suggests that other shareholders have a relatively small pool of CEO talent to proceed to managerial improvement when a CEO turnover takes place. JEL: G30; M51; P34; O16
Introduction
This paper considers the reaction of the Chinese stock market to announcements of a change in the chief executive officer (CEO) of a listed firm. The concern for stockholders is whether CEO replacement will influence the company's stock value. Market expectations provide clues about the effectiveness of one of the most important internal monitoring mechanism: the possibility to dismiss a poor performing CEO, which allows evaluating the maturity of corporate governance in China.
Most firms listed on China's stock exchanges are still majority-owned by the state. In Chinese state-owned firms, the board of directors typically rubber-stamps the decision by state authorities to replace the CEO (Kato and Long, 2006) . The incoming manager is thus expected to act in line with the state controlling shareholder objectives. By implication, the impact of CEO turnover is likely to be different for a state-owned enterprise and a privately held enterprise to the extent the objectives of controlling shareholders diverge. Does CEO turnover actually affect stock prices? While the immediate intuition is that CEO turnover should influence stock prices, the theoretical literature offers three distinct views on this issue.
The scapegoat hypothesis predicts no abnormal change in stock returns around CEO turnover announcements. Here, the market assumes CEOs are fungible. Dismissal in case of poor performance is only required as a threat to insure that CEOs exert efforts. The next manager is not expected to have a higher ability. The information hypothesis, in contrast, predicts negative abnormal stock returns around the time of the CEO turnover announcement as it reveals information about poor management choices. The ability hypothesis considers that abilities of CEOs vary, so boards seek out the best talent available. Thus, there should be a positive stock market reaction as the market expects the succeeding CEO to be a better manager.
The empirical literature attempting to disentangle these assumptions fails to provide clear conclusions about stock market reactions to such events. Some studies find a positive reaction (Adams and Mansi, 2009 ), others a negative reaction (Dedman and Lin, 2002) , or no significant reaction (Warner, Watts, and Wruck, 1988) . All studies in this area deal with the stock market of developed countries. Our paper is thus the first to our best knowledge to investigate this issue in a developing country.
The existing literature shows that the probability of a CEO turnover in China increases when a firm performs poorly. Kato and Long (2006) point out the connection between CEO replacement and firm performance is generally more tenuous for state-owned enterprises, which, they postulate, tend to pursue mutually conflicting objectives. They might act in order to correct market failures by pursuing social goals such as high employment (Dixit, 1997) .
They might seek their own private benefits by tunneling resources from their listed subsidiary, as pointed out in China by Jiang et al. (2010) . All these objectives come at the expense of economic performance. State-shareholders need, however, to maintain a minimum level of performance in order to pursue their multiple objectives. Indeed, Chang and Wong (2009) find that the link between CEO turnover and firm performance only exists in loss-making state-owned enterprises. If state-owned enterprises incur too many losses, state-shareholders face a high incentive to restore economic performance in order to pursue their multiples objectives in the future. Thus, CEO turnover in a state-owned enterprise may signal a recommitment on the part of the state shareholder to improve the firm's economic performance. We, thus, expect a positive market reaction to CEO turnover in a state-owned enterprise.
While the pool of available CEOs in China is increasing rapidly, there appears to be an insufficient supply on the CEO labor market (Fan et al., 2007) . Party membership can be interpreted as an indicator of human capital for managers (Li et al., 2008) . We expect central state-owned firms to be more able to attract managers with the highest party responsibilities.
We therefore expect a greater positive market reaction when a CEO turnover announcement involves an enterprise owned mainly by the central government; CEOs of such state-owned enterprises are likely to be high-level party members themselves or have close ties with the party elite.
To assess the impact of CEO turnover announcements on stock prices, we apply standard event study methodology to a sample of 1,094 CEO turnover announcements from 2002 to 2010. Our overall finding is that market reactions to CEO turnover announcements are positive. Consistent with the hypothesis that these central state-owned enterprises have far greater opportunities to recruit the top CEO talent, we find this positive market reaction applies only to the sub-sample of central state-owned enterprises. Thus, the ability hypothesis applies to central state-owned enterprises in China, while the scapegoat hypothesis applies to privately owned enterprises and enterprises owned by local administrations.
In the rest of the paper, section 2 develops our hypotheses on stock market reaction to CEO turnover. Section 3 presents the data and methodology of the study. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
Hypotheses on stock market reaction to CEO turnover in China
The first subsection develops the hypotheses from the theoretical literature. The second subsection considers several special characteristics of the Chinese economy.
Stock market reaction to CEO turnover: theoretical literature hypotheses
The literature (e.g. Bonnier and Brunner, 1989; Huson et al., 2004) explores three hypotheses of stock market reaction to CEO turnover announcements in developed economies. These provide a framework for our discussion of stock returns surrounding CEO turnover announcements in China.
The ability hypothesis (a real effect) holds that managers have different abilities and skill-sets. As CEO talent is not directly observable, stakeholders and market participants infer CEO ability from realized performance. In the event of a CEO turnover, the incoming CEO is assumed to have greater ability than the departing CEO, whose poor performance is a matter of record. The market reacts positively as CEO turnover implies coming improvement in firm performance.
The information hypothesis (an informational effect) holds that CEO turnover indicates poor management choices yet to be revealed to the public. Asymmetry of information between insiders (the board of directors) and outsiders (investors) diminishes as soon as the CEO turnover is announced and the market reacts negatively as the revelation of information about the board's poor management choice.
The scapegoat hypothesis builds on an agency model frameworks developed by Mirrlees (1976) , Holmström (1979) , and Shavell (1979) . Under the model developed by Kim (1996) , all managers have equal ability. Firm performance therefore is the result of manager efforts and a random factor interpreted as luck. As this random factor is mean-reverting (mean zero), a manager's failure to deliver full effort leads to termination. The controlling shareholder thus wields a credible threat of dismissal in the event of poor performance to insure that managers always strive to give their best performance. In the event of poor performance, the CEO is dismissed to maintain the credibility of the dismissal threat. Here, the market treats CEOs as fungible, so an incoming CEO is seen to possess similar abilities to other managers and the potential to give equivalent effort. CEO turnover does not signal an improvement in managerial quality, so the announcement of a CEO change provides no new information on a firm's prospects and raises no investor expectations about the firm's future performance. Thus, the scapegoat hypothesis predicts no abnormal returns in a firm's stock price on news of CEO turnover.
Stock market reaction to CEO turnover: hypotheses for China
Chinese capital markets are notable in that the government has retained control over a majority of state-owned enterprises after their listing. Only partial ownership of state-owned enterprises was sold to public investors. These state-owned enterprises tend to pursue multiple and often contradictory goals (Kato and Long, 2006) . These objectives encompass two dimensions. State objectives take two forms. First, a state-owned enterprise might pursue a social objective such as boosting employment to correct a market failure (Dixit, 1997) .
Employment and other social concerns are well-established roles of state-owned enterprises (Bai et al., 2000) . Second, managers of state-owned enterprises may pursue interests beneficial to private individuals (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) . Jiang et al. (2010) In principle, external and internal governance mechanisms should prevent stateshareholders from pursuing goals other than profit maximization. However, ownership is highly concentrated in the hand of the controlling shareholder in China, which is a common characteristic in countries with weak protection of investor rights (La Porta et al., 2000) . Until the start of the non-tradable share reform in August 2005, state-shares in listed companies were even non-tradable. As a result, hostile takeovers are almost non-existent in the Chinese stock market, meaning that external governance mechanisms cannot play their disciplinary role.
With the promulgation of the Company Law in 1993, China established a formal internal corporate governance structure comparable to that of Western countries. The
Company Law states that the decision to appoint or dismiss the CEO lies in the hands of the board of directors, and that the CEO is directly responsible to the board of directors. In stateowned enterprises, of course, the state actually makes the decisions on appointing or firing key personnel, including the CEO (Wong et al., 2004; Chang and Wong, 2009 This arrangement severely undermines a major internal corporate governance mechanism, i.e. the possibility of dismissing a poorly performing CEO. Previous literature observes that the link between CEO performance and turnover in China is weaker in stateowned enterprises than in privately held firms (Kato and Long, 2006; Chi and Wang, 2009; Chang and Wong, 2009 Kato and Long (2006) study the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover. They find a modest relation between firm performance and CEO turnover, i.e. a poor-performing firm has a higher probability of changing its CEO in the following year. They also find substantial variation depending on whether the firm is ultimately owned by the state or private investors, and that a weaker performance-turnover link can be distinguished for state-owned enterprises. Chi and Wang (2009) analyze how type of ownership and concentration of ownership affect CEO turnover for Chinese listed firms. They also find that the performance-turnover link is weaker for state-owned enterprises than privately owned enterprises.
Using a dataset of Chinese listed firms for the period 1995−2001, Chang and Wong (2009) study the performance-turnover link, accounting for the fact that most firms are stateowned and pursue multiple objectives. In their objective function, state shareholders are seen to attach greater weight to firm performance and less to social or private benefit when the firm performs poorly. When a firm incurs severe losses, it becomes a burden for the state shareholder and state-owned bank creditors. State-shareholders have an incentive to minimize losses in order to deliver sufficient ex-post financial performance to pursue their multiple objectives. As a consequence, state-owned enterprises incurring too much loss face pressure to improve performance. Chang and Wong (2009) find CEO turnover for loss-making stateowned enterprises, but no sign of a CEO performance-turnover link for profit-making stateowned enterprises. They suggest that the state shareholder only feels motivated to discipline the CEO when the firm's bad performance becomes a burden on state officials.
1 Fan et al. (2007) is an exception. They find that poor performance is associated with voluntary and involuntary CEO turnovers in Chinese listed firms, but identify no ownership characteristics (e.g. percentage of state shares) that might influence this link. Chang and Wong (2009, p.233) observe that "the ability to improve performance will be an important consideration in the selection and appointment of a new CEO." Thus, CEO turnover signals a shift by the state shareholder away from its other objectives to economic performance. Signaling theory is concerned about reducing information asymmetries between two parties (Spence, 2002) . By hiring a new CEO, a state-shareholder signals to the investors a new commitment towards economic performance. The underlying market reaction will then depend on the credibility of the signal, i.e. whether the new CEO has a higher expected ability than the departing one. If the change is credible to the investors, a real effect should be observed in line with the ability hypothesis. Following this line of reasoning, we propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1:
The market reaction around a CEO turnover announcement for a stateowned enterprise will be positive.
As the state shareholder will appoint a new CEO based on ability to pursue the economic performance objective, expectations about firm performance improve. Consistent with the ability hypothesis, we expect a jump in the stock price (positive abnormal returns).
However, China is characterized by a relatively small pool of CEO talent (Fan et al., 2007) . The credibility of the signal can be severely undermined if the state-owned firm is not able to attract the best CEO talents. It is therefore questionable whether a CEO turnover announcement will impact the market due to the lack of depth in the CEO labor pool.
We expect central state-owned enterprises to be able to attract the CEO candidates. In China, party membership is an indicator of certain skill-sets and entrepreneurial abilities (Li et al., 2008) . According to Lin and Bian (1991) and Walder (1995) , candidates for party membership must attain a certain educational level and show their ability to outperform coworkers. Since the beginning of economic reforms, selection criteria for party membership have moved to favor candidates with high education rather than family class origin (Bian et al., 2001 ). Although we are unable to determine whether a succeeding CEO is a party member, it seems likely that most CEOs appointed to head up state enterprises controlled by the central government are high-level party members themselves or have close ties with party elite.
2 In any case, acting as CEO of a central state-owned enterprise inherently makes one part of China's elite. Any replacement CEO is likely to possess considerable educational background and skills. Consistent with the ability hypothesis, and complementary to the signal that the state shareholder prioritizes economic performance when it announces a change of CEO, the expected ability of the successor CEO should be higher than the expected ability of the departing CEO (based on past performance) in central state-owned enterprises.
Hypothesis 2: As the successor CEO of a central state-owned enterprise is expected to possess high education and skills, positive abnormal returns should be larger around CEO turnover announcements of central state-owned enterprises than for other types of enterprise.
A corollary of this hypothesis is that market reaction to a CEO turnover announcement for a local state-owned enterprise is uncertain and depends on the supply of CEO talent available to provincial or local administration shareholders. If local state-owned enterprises are not able to attract the best performing CEO, the signaling induced by a CEO turnover loses its credibility.
Finally, a CEO turnover in a privately held enterprise does not signal a recommitment to improved economic performance on the part of the controlling shareholder. As the performance-turnover link is stronger in privately-owned firms, bad performing CEO should be quickly dismissed when performance starts to deteriorate. Expected improved performance for the firm should thus be smaller 3 . Given the small pool of CEO talent in China, which decreases the differences in ability among managers, the scapegoat hypothesis might well apply to this category of firms.
Hypothesis 3: There is no abnormal market reaction to CEO turnover announcement in the case of privately owned enterprises.
Data and methodology

Sample selection and summary statistics
Our study requires the construction of a large dataset including information on CEO turnover Central state-owned enterprises that change their CEO are bigger and better performing compared to local state-owned enterprises and privately-owned enterprises. They are also less prone to failure compared to privately-owned enterprises.
Methodology
To test the effect of CEO turnover announcements on stock prices in China, we examine the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around CEO turnover announcements using standard event study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985) . Abnormal returns are defined as the difference between actual and expected returns.
This methodology is commonly used in the literature. Notably, two studies on another topic calculate abnormal returns for Chinese listed firms to assess the impact of loan announcements on stock prices (Bailey et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2012) .
The estimation period for computing the market model parameters is the time period [-160, -21] , with day 0 being the announcement day. 7 We use daily closing prices to compute stocks and index returns. The proxy for the market return is either the Shanghai stock exchange composite index or the Shenzhen stock exchange composite index depending on the listing location of the firm. We test if the CAR is statistically different from 0 using the standardized cross-sectional t-test proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) . 
Results
Abnormal returns around CEO turnover announcements
We present summary CAR statistics around CEO turnover announcements for a variety of event windows in Table 3 This does not come as a surprise given the information leakage observed in the days preceding turnover announcements.
Overall, the ability hypothesis appears to be the more suitable hypothesis as turnover provokes on average a positive reaction on stock prices. The market anticipates a future increase in firm performance after a CEO turnover.
These results from Table 3 show that on average a CEO turnover exerts an impact on stock prices in China. Positive consequences are anticipated for such an event.
Univariate analysis by ownership type
We now go deeper into the analysis by investigating whether stock price patterns around a CEO turnover are influenced by ownership of the firm. We showed earlier that the stock market reaction is generally positive just prior a CEO turnover announcement. We focus here These results are consistent with our hypotheses. As Chinese listed firms offer poor protections of investor rights and weak corporate governance, state-owned enterprises are free to pursue objectives other than profit maximization. A CEO turnover announcement in a state-owned firm signals market participants that economic performance has re-emerged as the state's (controlling shareholder) top priority. Market reaction is positive because the renewed emphasis on economic performance with a change of CEO increases the expected profits of the firm. Moreover, while the successor CEO of a central state-owned enterprise likely has superior ability relative to the overall pool of CEO talent, the small size of that pool means local state-owned and privately owned enterprises are unlikely to enjoy the same recruiting power and access to these top individuals.
Multivariate analysis
We now turn to multivariate analysis by regressing cumulative abnormal returns on a set of independent variables. We employ a large set of event windows to check the robustness of our To capture the influence of the succeeding CEO being an insider or an outsider on stock prices pattern, we include Source of successor; a dummy variable equal to 1 if the succeeding CEO is an outsider and 0 if it is an insider. Although there is no consensus on the effect of insider versus outsider succession, 10 the appointment of an outsider is generally assumed to have a weaker effect compared to the appointment of an insider. An outsider lacks firmspecific skills and experience, while the board of directors knows the insider and is in a better position to evaluate their ability. Moreover, going outside the firm could reduce the motivation of other insider managers. An alternative hypothesis, however, predicts that outsiders are not committed to past decisions and can implement new strategies and policies in the firm that leads to a stronger positive market reaction (Bonnier and Bruner, 1989) .
We also take into account board characteristics with our variables Dual BC and GM and Independent directors. Dual BC and GM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the succeeding CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors, and 0 otherwise. Fan et al. (2007) report evidence that when a general manager is also chairman of the board, the link between firm performance and CEO turnover is weaker. This duality could thus insulate a successor CEO from the disciplining function of the board. To control for board influence, the variable Independent directors is computed as the number of independent directors to the total number of board members. A more independent board should be more sensitive to remove a poor performing CEO.
The corporate governance literature shows that CEO personal characteristics influence investors' reaction (e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2008) . We take into account two characteristics of the departing CEO in the regressions: Age and Years in office.
We also include financial characteristics which are likely to influence the stock price pattern of the firm when a CEO turnover is announced: Firm size, Lagged IROA and Altman Z-score. Firm size is the natural logarithm of balance sheet total assets. Reinganum (1985) suggests the organizational structures of smaller firms are less complex than those of larger firms; a change in the top executive may have a larger impact on a small enterprise. Dedman and Lin (2002) CEOs leaving firms with a higher financial risk.
All regressions include time, province and industry fixed effects. As the pool of available CEOs might differ from one industrial sector to another and state-owned enterprises are more represented in certain industries, the industry sector has to be taken into account in the regressions. The industry classification comes from the Industry Classifying Index released by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). As the development of Chinese provinces has followed an unequal path, it is arguable that objectives of state-owned enterprises differ depending on where they are located 11 . By including province dummies, we control for a potential geographical effect. A province dummy variable is equal to one when the firm's headquarter is located in the concerned province, and zero otherwise. The second four columns only include CSOE, POE variables and industry province and time dummies in the regressions. This allows including the whole 1,155 observations from 11 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
our sample. The last four columns include all the variables which causes the sample to reduce to 657 observations due to lack of data availability. We observe that the coefficient for CSOE is always positive and significant with the exception of one column (CAR[0, 1] in the eight column). The effect is estimated to be rather large: in the four last columns, being a central state-owned firm increases the cumulative abnormal returns in a range of 1.280% to 2.031% depending on the event window.
These results suggest that the effect on stock prices of a CEO turnover announcement is influenced by the nature of the shareholder. In accordance with our hypotheses, firms controlled by the central government experience on average a significantly positive abnormal return. This result holds even after controlling for other characteristics which might be strongly correlated with CSOE such as firm size and industry sector. On the other hand, we find weak evidence on the influence of privately-owned enterprises on stock prices in the regressions: the negative coefficient is significant only once when the dependent variable is CAR[-1, 1]. However, this is only the case when we do not control for other characteristics of the firm and CEO. Thus, the multivariate analysis suggests that privately-owned firms have rather no influence on stock prices than a negative effect. Finally it is striking to observe that no other variables than those reflecting ownership type influence stock price patterns.
Market prediction and accounting performance change after a CEO turnover
So far, our evidence of firm performance change after a CEO turnover is only based on market reaction. To check whether market reaction is in accordance with accounting performance change before and after a CEO turnover, we observe accounting performance change before and after the CEO turnover. Accounting performance is measured with the firm return on assets (ROA) on three different years: the year before, in and after the CEO turnover. Table 6 reports the tests on performance changes before and after the event by grouping firms in subsamples.
We first group firms having positive CAR on the event window [-1, 1] . These firms experience a significantly positive increase in accounting performance change before and after a CEO turnover announcement when performance change is measured between the year preceding the turnover and the year after the turnover, and no significant increase in performance change when it is measure between the year of the turnover and the year after.
Second we test the accounting performance change for firms experiencing negative CAR on the event window [-1, 1]. On both performance change measures, firms with negative CAR do not experience any significant increase in accounting performance.
Result remains qualitatively unchanged when we only select firms with positive CAR in the highest quartile and firms with negative CAR in the lowest quartile. Thus, these results are rather in line with market prediction.
We also group the firms by ownership type to further check whether ownership is relevant in performance change after a CEO turnover. State-owned enterprises do not experience an increase in accounting performance. Privately-owned enterprises do not show an increase in performance when performance change is measured between one year after and the year of CEO turnover. However, privately-owned enterprises experience an increase in performance when performance change is measured between the year preceding turnover and the year after the turnover occurred. This last result runs contrary to what market reactions predict. When we distinguish between central state-owned and local state-owned accounting performance changes, we find no increase in performance for local state-owned enterprises and a significant increase in performance for central state-owned firms on both performance change measures. These results are in total accordance with market prediction.
Conclusion
This paper examined the stock market reaction around CEO turnover announcements in China. As there is no consensus on the stockholder wealth effect of a CEO turnover in the literature, our contribution adds a new perspective from an emerging country. We find that, in terms of cumulative abnormal returns), CEO turnover announcements in China induced a positive stock market reaction overall in our sample. This was driven largely by the positive reaction for state enterprises owned by the central government. The reaction is not significant for state enterprises owned by local administrations. Privately owned enterprises show mixed results in univariate analysis: either no reaction or a negative reaction after a CEO turnover announcement. When we control for other characteristics, only central state-owned firms experience a significant positive change on their stock price. This evidence is also backed by a significant change in accounting performance before and after the CEO turnover year in central state-owned enterprises. Privately-owned enterprises do not appear to experience any particular change on their stock price.
These findings support the ability hypothesis for central state-owned enterprises, meaning that ability is taken into account for CEO turnovers in these enterprises. This conclusion is consistent with previous literature on CEO turnover on China, according to which CEO turnovers signal a recommitment to the objective of profitable economic performance.
Our findings also support the scapegoat hypothesis for local state-owned enterprises and privately held enterprises. In these cases, a CEO change is not associated with greater managerial performance, but rather as a show of board commitment to exercising its prerogative to hire and fire CEOs to get full performance out of them. Due to China's small pool of CEO talent, we only observe a positive reaction in central state-owned enterprises where the state shareholder may have access to managers with higher levels of ability. We interpret the absence of market reaction to CEO turnover announcements in privately owned and local state-owned enterprises as a consequence of the relatively small pool of available CEO talent. The average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated using the market model and standard event study methodology. The estimation window for calculating market model parameters is [-160, -21] . CARs are tested for significance using a two-tail Boehmer's et al. (1991) Table 6 Accounting performance before and after the CEO turnover
The table reports percent changes in return on assets (ROA) for subsamples of firms. ROA t-1 , ROA t and ROA t+1 are the ROA of a company in respectively the accounting year before, in and after the announcement year. ***, **, * indicate significance at respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
Subsample of firms
